Operation Overlord
From
the moment the United States entered World War II, American war
planners focused upon one primary strategic accomplishment--an
amphibious assault across the narrow passage of water that
separated Great Britain from the European continent known as the English
Channel.
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The British envisioned
what eventually became the D-Day Invasion as
requisite to protecting their own island nation from
invasion by Germany.
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The French Resistance
saw the arrival of Allied troops on their shores as the only
means of liberating their cities and countryside from the
occupation of Nazi troops.
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The Russians were
desperate for any action in western Europe that would force
Adolph Hitler to pull back resources from his Eastern Front.
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United States
military commanders, convinced that the only way to win the war was with "boots on the ground," were convinced
only a ground assault on occupied France would provide the
means to attack and defeat the German army in a drive to
Berlin.
Virtually every other plan
and every other directive issued to commanders in the field was
predicated upon the invasion that came to be called "Operation
Overlord." Even the Pacific war, half-a-world away, revolved
around the cross-channel crossing in Europe. General MacArthur's
army, Admirals Nimitz and Halsey's navies, and General George Kenney's air
force, were all relegated to simply containing Japanese
aggression in Asia and the Pacific until after the cross-channel
Allied assault brought the Third Reich to its knees.
Invading Fortress Europe
was the focal point of discussions among President Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Churchill, as well as the Allied war planners of both
nations, at the Arcadia Conference in January 1942, just weeks
after the United States entered the war. Franklin Roosevelt
promised both Churchill and the Soviets that American ground
forces would engage the Germans before the end of that first year
of the war, and it was assumed by most parties involved that this
meant a cross-channel invasion before December 1942, or very early
the following year.
Six months later with
American troops arriving in Britain, Winston Churchill began questioning the
wisdom of an immediate cross-channel attack, and sharing those concerns with President Roosevelt. Nazi forces were
well-entrenched in France; the Luftwaffe ruled the skies over
western Europe and was prepared to use its aerial supremacy to promptly
decimate invading ground troops. Prime Minister Churchill's
concerns were quickly validated.
Early on the morning of
August 19, 1942, more than 6,000 Allied troops, most Canadian but
including 50 U.S. Army Rangers and 1,000 British soldiers, crossed
the English channel for a dawn landing at the French port of
Dieppe. A chance encounter with German ships during the Channel crossing
cost the invasion force the element of surprise. By nightfall the
Allied invaders at Dieppe had suffered more than 60% casualties
amid a desperate, but hardly effective, effort to rescue the
survivors. Aerial support from the Royal Air Force and the Royal
Canadian Air Force became virtually nonexistent in the face of
Hitler's mighty Luftwaffe. The British and Canadians lost 119
airplanes to only 46 of the enemy's.
The failed Dieppe raid was
mute testimony to the obstacles the Allies faced when the moment
came to make the full-scale invasion and breach the Atlantic
Wall. It was, further, a poignant message to Allied war planners
that before Operation Overlord could be successfully
launched, there was a lot of preparatory work to be done.
President Roosevelt kept his
Arcadia Conference promise, attacking Hitler's forces before the
end of 1942. That amphibious assault, which included U.S. ground troops
already in England and one force dispatched from the United
States, landed throughout North Africa on November 8, 1942. Operation
Torch was the largest amphibious assault in world history, and
one of the most successful. The President's controversial
decision, urged upon him by Prime Minister Churchill, to postpone
invading occupied France by crossing the English Channel which
measures only 150 miles at its widest point in favor of crossing
thousands of miles of the South Atlantic to land in North Africa,
was a fatefully wise decision. Of the nearly 125,000 American and
British soldiers that landed in North Africa in Operation Torch
there were fewer than 1,500 casualties--half the number suffered
by the 6,100 Dieppe Raiders in their cross-channel attack on
occupied France earlier that year.
In January 1943, one year
after Roosevelt and Churchill's first face-to-face war
council in the Arcadia Conference, the two leaders (along
with French commanders Charles de Gaulle and Henri
Giraud) met in newly liberated North Africa for the Casablanca
Conference. The importance of this meeting is evident in the
precedents set by President Roosevelt: It was the first time an
American President had ever visited Africa, and the first time in
U.S. history that a
sitting President had ever left the country during a time of war.
Much of the strategy detailed
by the Allied leaders and their top military commanders at
Casablanca concerned the continued Allied efforts in the Mediterranean,
including amphibious and airborne invasions of Sicily and Italy.
But again, as before, the focal point of the conference was on the
anticipated cross-channel invasion of northern France. The successful campaign
in North Africa and the planned operations across the
Mediterranean were to be but a strategic effort to force Hitler to divide
his forces, thereby weakening his military might in France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands. Only then could D-Day commence.
Pointblank
During
the Battle of Britain the German Luftwaffe had validated
the previously under-recognized value of strategic bombardment. It
was only the sheer guts and determination of the British citizenry
under the valiant leadership of Prime Minister Churchill that had
prevented utter destruction and surrender a year before the United
States entered the war. America's decision to at last enter the
war that had been going on for years was precipitated by
Japan's unprecedented lesson in the power of military aviation. As
a result, for the first time aerial combat strategy became a major
concern for Allied war planners. The air effort and the conduct of
strategic bombardment against Germany was addressed in the
President's war plan in early 1941, and in the post-Pearl Harbor Arcadia
Conference.
Though the U.S. Mighty Eighth
Air Force had been conducting bombing operations for six months
prior to the Casablanca Conference, their impact on the war
effort had been negligible for lack of aircraft and due to the
transfer of much of their assets to North Africa for Operation
Torch. All of that changed in January 1943 with the Pointblank directive that ordered around-the-clock,
unrelenting bombing of German targets (the R.A.F. bombing at night, the Mighty
Eighth striking in daring daylight missions.)
Targets
defined by the Pointblank directive were broad: submarine pens, enemy air
fields, factories, bridges, railroads, and anything else that
contributed to the success of Germany to carry on the war. Early
in 1943 the Eighth Air Force struck primarily against the
submarine pens that flooded the Atlantic with U-Boats with which
to rule the seas and prevent American soldiers and war materials
from reaching Great Britain.
Though
there were no safe targets, compared to that which was to
come these early missions at least limited the time heavy bombers
had to remain over enemy controlled land where they were subject
to anti-aircraft fire or land-based fighters. On January 27, 1943,
General Ira Eaker, commander of the Eighth Air Force, sent more
than fifty bombers across the North Sea to bomb the ship yards at
Vegesack. It was the first American air strike into Germany since
the end of World War I. By summer,
with the arrival of additional bombers and air crews, General
Eaker was able to field larger and larger formations and on July
17, 1943, his assets had increased to the point that he was able
to field his first formation of more than 300 heavy bombers.
Large
bomber formations were crucial to Eaker's daylight, strategic
bombardment approach to the Pointblank directive. The RAF
flew only at night when darkness provided some shield from enemy
fighters. But the same darkness that hid them from gun crews on
the grounds and enemy pilots in the air, also masked targets from
the bombardiers. R.A.F. bombardiers used radar bombing, a
rudimentary method of identifying their targets by contrasting the
radar echoes of water and land, to try and map out the terrain
otherwise unseen below, in order to locate targets. The practice
resulted in bomb loads falling across large areas, hopefully some
striking the intent ended targets, a method that became known as Area
Bombing.
With
the newly introduced Norden bomb sight, General Eaker believed that daylight missions
gave his bombardiers the ability to rain
greater destruction with pin-point accuracy on enemy targets. Visual
bombing in broad daylight was the controversial strategy of the
Mighty Eighth, an experiment opposed by the R.A.F. but subsequently
argued successfully by Eaker at the Casablanca Conference.
Inbound to target the American bombardiers were able to actually
SEE and identify the assigned aiming point through the Norden bomb.
The computerized bomb sight then actually flew the aircraft to
enable the bomb load to be delivered with considerable precision.
An
ancillary advantage to visual bombing was the post raid
intelligence gleaned. Bombs dropped at night on a image reflected on
a radar screen could only be seen as exploding blossoms of light far
below. There was no way to tell how many actually hit their
targets, or for that matter if the image on the screen was truly the
assigned target. Photo reconnaissance the following day was also
unreliable, as it was difficult to distinguish damage inflicted from
the previous night's raid from damage that was days, or even weeks,
old. During visual bombing raids it was relatively easy to
watch the trail of falling ordnance, noting how the pattern fell on
or near a visually recognizable aiming point.
Daylight
visual bombing, despite its advantages, was a dangerous
practice. In clear, well-lit skies, Eaker's bombers more vulnerable to enemy fighters which
swarmed the combat theater, especially by the summer of 1943. In 1942 only 38% of the Luftwaffe's fighter
force was operating on the Western Front, with 43% in the east and
the remainder in the Mediterranean. By the summer of 1943 nearly
half of Hitler's fighters had been shifted to defend against
Allied aerial attacks mounted on France, Holland, and Germany from Great Britain.
On
short-range missions General Eaker's bombers found some protection
from fighter escorts, but as the targets became more distant the
limited fuel the fighters carried prohibited them from making the
full trip. On long-range missions when the fuel-starved fighter escort was forced to turn
back, Eaker's bombers were forced to fend for themselves, relying solely
on their impressive array of machine guns and the collective might
of their sizable formations.
On
Saturday, July 24, 1943, General Eaker sent more than 300 bombers
on a 2,000-mile attack on German industrial plants in Norway. Most
of the trip was the flight over the North Sea and little
resistance was met over the target; the Eighth lost only one
bomber. In the following days his airmen were not so fortunate
when they stuck at Hamburg, Hanover, and other targets deep in
inside Germany. These long-range missions, the first into the
heart of Germany's war production facilities, were the basis of
the Pointblank directive. Reaching these important targets
however, placed the inbound formations over occupied territory for
a dangerous period of time and casualties began to mount.
Eighty-eight bombers were lost during Little Blitz Week and
more than 900 American airmen were killed, wounded, or missing in
action.
On
August 17 the Eighth Air Force celebrated the beginning of their
second year of combat operations by dispatching 376 heavy bombers
against Schweinfurt, where half of Germany's ball bearings were
produced, and also against the Messerschmidt factory at Regensburg.
The deepest penetration of German territory by American bombers to
date, it cost 60 bombers destroyed (16% of those sent) and 55 damaged beyond
repair.
Undeterred
by the high casualties, the Eighth Air Force continued to pound
Germany's war production. A September 6 mission against the ball
bearing works at Stuttgart cost 45 of 262 bombers dispatched
(17%), and a series of raids the week of October 3 - 10 that sent
a total of 855 Flying Fortresses and Liberators deep
into enemy territory cost another 88 bombers (10% casualties).
That latter period became known as Black Week, but the worst was yet to
come.
On October 14
the Mighty Eighth returned to Schweinfurt with 257 heavy
bombers, including fifteen B-17s of the 305th Can Do
Bombardment Group. As quickly as the formation's fighter escort
was forced by their limited fuel to turn back, German fighters
moved in with abandon. In less than an hour 28 heavy bombers went down
to enemy fighters or to flak, and 31 heavily-damaged bombers fell
from the sky trying to get home after dropping their bombs. A
sixtieth bomber was forced to ditch in the English Channel and
five were abandoned in the air or crash-landed in England. The 23%
casualty rate was stunning, marking the date as Black Thursday.
At
Chelveston Air Field in England, two badly shot-up Fortresses of
the "Can Do" Group managed to land and taxi to a
stop. Anxious ground crews milled around, scanning the skies for
the remaining thirteen bombers of the 305th that had taken off
earlier that morning. "Where's the rest of the the
ships?" the group commander reportedly inquired.
"Sir,"
answered a haggard veteran of that deadly mission, "there
are no more ships. We are the only ones left."

Throughout
the summer and fall of 1943 the men of the Mighty Eight had
valiantly risen above the obstacles they faced on a near-daily basis
over enemy territory to carry on their mission. The fateful October
mission to Schweinfurt, by Allied estimates, had cut German ball
bearing production in half. But Black Thursday struck a blow
to the psyche of the airmen that was hard to recover from. In order
to accomplish the job set before the Mighty Eighth of
destroying Germany's ability to fill the skies with fighters, and
wrest from the Luftwaffe aerial superiority over France before
ground troops crossed the English Channel, something had to change.
The Eighth Air Force could not sustain such heavy losses and
continue operations.
In
the early days of the war American bomber formations were escorted
across the Channel by British Spitfires with a fuel supply
that enabled them to travel only 175 miles from their home fields.
The P-47 Thunderbolts that arrived in May 1943
were formidable fighters, but their range was little better than
that of the Spitfires until the innovative American airmen
began adding 70-gallon belly tanks, extending their range to 340
miles. By fall, when the Eighth Air Force began striking deep into
Germany, 108-gallon drop tanks gave the fighters a range of 375
miles, enabling them to escort about as far as Hamburg.
In November
the first long-range P-51 Mustangs arrived at Boxted Airdrome
in
England. With auxillary drop tanks these new fighters were capable of
escorting bomber formations 850 miles, enabling them to protect a
formation all the way to targets deep in Germany and back home
again.
In December the Mustangs flew their first missions,
demonstrating their long-range capabilities across the North Sea
during the Battle of Bremen. Still rebuilding from the heavy losses
of October, the Mighty Eighth mounted missions primarily
across the North Sea into northern Germany. Not until more Mustangs
arrived would they fly again so deep into Germany.
Meanwhile, the
305th Bombardment Group struggled to recover from the loss of 13 of 15 bombers and
130 of the 150 airmen who had
flown the Schweinfurt mission.
Lieutenant William Bill
Lawley
Twenty-three year old William Robert Lawley arrived at
Chelveston, England, in November as a B-17 replacement pilot
for the Can Do Group. Born and raised in the small town of Leeds, Alabama,
he enlisted for flight training in August 1942 and earned
his wings in April 1943. Lieutenant Lawley and his
9-man
crew trained in Florida in the late summer, learning to work
together to fly their big Fortress, navigate
accurately to an assigned location while gunners defended
their bomber, and accurately release their bomb load on an
assigned target. Each man in the Flying Fort had
specialized skills, but the success of a bomber crew
demanded the highest level of team work under the guidance
of the pilot, who was the aircraft commander. Lieutenant
Paul Murphy flew in the right-hand seat as Bill Lawley's
co-pilot, while the crew's two other officers,
Lieutenant Seraphine (Navigator) and Lieutenant Harry Mason
(Bombardier),
performed their own important work below the cockpit in the
clear Plexiglas nose. Behind the cockpit Staff Sergeant
Rowley manned the top turret guns, a position usually
assigned to the Flight Engineer. Behind the bomb racks was
the radio room where Staff Sergeant Dempsey handled
communications, and immediately behind and below his cubicle
hung the
Ball Turret where Sergeant Kobierecki literally filled one of the
most uncomfortable, yet critical, positions in the bomber. Behind
the hatch of the Ball Turret were open windows on either
side of the fuselage from which the waist gunners manned
their swiveling 50-caliber machine guns while frigid air
streamed in at 400-miles per hour. At bombing altitude the
temperature was often minus forty degrees--and colder, and
Sergeants Speers and Ralph Braswell suffered though
much misery to rain fire on would-be attackers from either side.
Finally,
after a long crawl through the narrow confines of the tail
section, Sergeant Alfred Wendt crouched to protect his
airplane from attacks on the bomber's rear in the Tail Gunner
position. The stinging bite of the tail gun had claimed many
German fighters, and the enemy quickly learned that attacks
on the nose were usually the safest route of attack, despite
guns manned by both the Navigator and Bombardier when the
ship was under siege. In fact, outside the cockpit, every man in the
bomber
regardless of his rank or his specialty, was a
gunner--prepared to fight off German fighters should they
move in to intercept a bomber on a mission.
.
|
Bill
Lawley's Crew

Standing (L-R)
Lawley, Murphy, Seraphine, Mason.
Kneeling (L-R) Wendt, Kobrecki, Braswell, Speers,
Rowley, Dempsey |
Such mutual
responsibility demanded that every air crew learn to work
like a team, and the men often became close friends. The
officers relied upon the crew's enlisted men,
non-commissioned officers all of them, to do whatever was
necessary to protect their ship. The NCOs in turn, quickly
developed confidence in their officers in general, and their
pilot in particular, to skillfully guide them all in performing their
mission and then do whatever was necessary to bring them
safely home. Lieutenant Bill Lawley was a bright, well-trained,
and caring leader that inspired confidence and pride in the
men of his Flying Fortress. Following
training in Florida Lieutenant Lawley and crew were assigned
to duty in England and flew north to prepare for their
trans-Atlantic flight. Traversing the east coast they were
forced to land in Maine to have an engine replaced, and
while on the ground Lieutenant Lawley found an artist to
paint the name "Cabin in the Sky" on his
B-17. After reaching England however, the crew was
separated from their newly-christened bomber and sent by
railroad train to Chelveston to help rebuild the 305th Bombardment Group.
Following
initial combat training upon arrival in England Lieutenant
Lawley and his crew at last began flying their first missions. As
was customary, the first flights were made with more
experienced air crews, and Lawley's team found itself
shifted around to fill in for vacancies on other ships in the Can Do Group
that was still recovering from the heavy losses of the
Schweinfurt mission. From December to mid-February
Lieutenant Lawley
and most of his men each flew flew nine missions, sometimes
with other crews, sometimes together in whatever B-17 was
available. Tail Gunner, Sergeant
Alfred Wendt, was the crew's first and only casualty. While filling in on a vacant position for another bomber
crew Sergeant Wendt's Fortress went
down over enemy territory. He spent the rest of the war in a
Prisoner of War camp, and Sergeant H. A. Malone was transferred
in as his replacement for Lawley's crew, a team that was still in search of
their own airplane. |
Air
crews were not all that were shuffled around as needed in the fall
of 1943. Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had
met in Quebec in August; again the chief topic of discussion was a
cross-channel invasion of the European continent. That invasion
began taking shape during a series of meetings in Cairo and Teheran
from November 23 to December 6. The Allied leadership councils
of war included Chaing Kai Shek, Turkey's Ismet Inonu, and others as
war planners hammered out details of their global mission,
including the war in Asia. But as always before, it was the invasion
of the European continent that was foremost in the minds of the
strategists and planners.
After
three days of meetings in Cairo the American President and British
Prime Minister met for three days in Teheran with Russian Premier
Joseph Stalin. They promised the Soviet leader that the Western
Allies would give priority to Operation Overlord and Operation
Anvil, the invasions of both Northern France and Southern
France. The representatives of the three nations also laid out their
goals in the "Declaration of the Three Powers" that
stated:
"We-The President
of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and
the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past,
in this, the Capital of our Ally, Iran, and have shaped and
confirmed our common policy.
"We
express our determination that our nations shall work together
in war and in the peace that will follow. As to war-our military
staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have
concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We
have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of
the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and
south.
"The
common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that
victory will be ours."
At the First Cairo Conference
(November 23 - 26) Winston Churchill agreed to a United States
command for Operation Overlord. Following the Teheran
Conference (November 28 - December 1) Churchill and Roosevelt
returned to Cairo to settle the details which included establishing
a unified command in the Mediterranean under General Sir Henry
Maitland Wilson. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed to
become Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force effective
January 1, 1944.
D-Day was set for May 1,
1944 -- four months
thereafter.
The
problem of Germany's continued aerial supremacy over Western Europe
remained a major obstacle to Operation Overlord. British Air
Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder was chosen to become
Eisenhower's deputy and a realignment of the U.S. Army Air
Forces command structure was ordered. Already the 9th Air Force
Command had been moved from the Mediterranean for close tactical
support of Operation Overlord. From December until the
invasion began however, the rapidly building 9th Air Force committed
its assets, including newly arriving P-51 Mustangs and medium-range
bombers, to supporting the Mighty Eighth in Pointblank. Just
how critical that mission was became clear on December 3 when Air
Chief Marshal Charles Portal sent a memo to the Combined Chiefs of
Staff advising that Pointblank was three months behind in
relationship to the tentative May 1, 1944, date for D-Day.
On
December 9, one week after the end of the Second Cairo Conference,
U.S. Army Air Force Chief Hap Arnold began realigning his Air
Forces to accomplish the goals set out by the Allied Leadership and
to get Pointblank back on schedule. In
one of Hap's more controversial decisions, General Eaker was ordered
to the Mediterranean to become commander of the Mediterranean Allied
Tactical Air Forces (MATAF) which included the 12th and 15th U.S.
Army Air Forces and the British Desert and Balkan Air Forces. While
the move was seen as something of a promotion, General Eaker
protested in vain his transfer from the Mighty Eighth that he
had worked so hard to build.
During
December General Eaker prepared to departed England with a big
show of force, demonstrating how far his Eighth Air Force had come
since their first mission eighteen months earlier when two-dozen
American bombers had made a quick sortie across the channel into
France. Repeatedly Eaker's Flying Fortresses and Liberators
pounded ship yards at Bremen, Whilhelmshaven, Kiel and Emden in
northern Germany. On December 13, of 710 bombers dispatched, 649
reached and bombed their targets, the first Eighth Air Force mission
to exceed 600 bombers in number. By the end of the month more than
13,000 pounds of bombs were dropped by Eighth Air Force bombers on
German targets, marking the first time in the war that American bomb
tonnage exceeded that of the R.A.F. On December 30 more than 650
bombers struck deep into Germany for the first time since Black
Thursday, attacking the chemical works at Ludwigshafen. This
time, escorted to target and back by P-51 Mustangs, they suffered
the loss of only 23 bombers.
On
January 5, 1944, while more than 400 heavy bombers were striking
targets in Germany and France, General Jimmy Doolittle flew from North Africa to
England to assume command of the Eighth Air Force. General George
Patton sent his friend a congratulatory letter to which Doolittle
responded: "Don't know whether or not congratulations are in
order. I have a bigger and more interesting job, but at the same
time it is infinitely more difficult than the one I had down below
(North Africa)....Down there, where you were not 'under the guns,'
any modest success was apparently appreciated. Up here miracles are
confidently anticipated."
The
day after Doolittle's arrival, 420 of his bombers returned to
Ludwigshafen to bomb the Farben Industrie plant, one of Hitler's two
largest chemical plants. This time only twelve American bombers
failed to return. It was to be the calm before the storm.
By
the time General Doolittle inherited the Mighty Eighth,
despite the heavy losses of the previous year American determination
in production gave him 25
heavy bomber groups and 15 fighter groups at his command, augmented by 18 fighter
groups of the Ninth Air Force (to support Eighth air force operations
until D-Day.) The first long-range P-51s had arrived in
England and demonstrated their capabilities throughout the previous
month. Amid intense pressure from the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO)
to strike often, strike hard, and strike in large numbers against Pointblank
targets in Germany, the stage was finally set to fully demonstrate
the value of daylight strategic bombardment and to validate the
USAAF mantra, verbalized by General Kenneth Walker in 1931 and
spelled out in AWPD-1 that: "The well-organized,
well-planned, and well-flown air force (bombing) attack will
constitute an offensive that cannot be stopped."
Cloudy winter weather now seemed the only
obstacle for mounting massive formations for deep penetration
missions to destroy the German war machine.
In the winter of 1943-44 the weather seemed to be allied with the
Axis however, and presented formidable opposition to achieving the
results the CBO was calling for from Doolittle's frustrated bomber
crews. From October through February major storms moved across
German targets and the English Channel nearly every three days. Even
when the cloud cover over England was light enough to allow Eighth
Air Force bombers and fighters to take off and assemble in formation
over the Channel, the impenetrable carpet remained almost
continuously over the European continent, masking critical
industrial targets that cranked out a daily supply of new German
fighter aircraft.
The
Mighty Eighth had learned the previous winter how difficult
the winter weather could make mounting daylight, visual bombing
raids. To enable daylight raids through cloud cover, H2X radar
equipped Pathfinder airships of the 482d Bombardment Group had begun
operations in fall of 1943. Each of the specially fitted B-17s with
their highly trained air crews were tasked with leading formations
to target when cloud cover made it impossible to locate the aiming
points through the Norden bomb sight. Each Pathfinder bomber would
lead a wing of sixty heavy bombers to target, marking the aiming
point with parachute flares for the inbound formation. The practice
was an area bombardment technique, similar to that practiced at
night by the R.A.F., and but for luck, tended to be all-too-often
ineffective. Radar, in 1943-44, was in its infancy and still a
rudimentary science. Terrain was reflected on the Pathfinder's
screen in shades, indicating a dark pattern for bodies of water, a
lighter pattern for land, and bright areas for towns or cities.
Targets such as Bremen which was located on the northern coast of
Germany were relatively easy to find with accuracy, but targets deep
inland melded into an almost unbroken light shade on the screen,
except in those unusual situations where a large river broke up the
pattern. This fact, perhaps far more than the heavy losses sustained
in the October missions deep into Germany, accounted for the fact
that most of December's missions had been flown against Bremen and
other targets on Germany's northern coast.
On
January 11 the cloud cover at last lifted enough for General Doolittle
to dispatch 633 bombers to attack
Luftwaffe fighter plants at Oschersleben, Halberstadt, and
Brunswick, the deepest penetration into the heart of Germany since
the tragic Schwinfurt mission nearly three months earlier. As the
formation reached the European continent however, the
weather closed back in and inclined Doolittle to recall the mission when the lead
flights were only 50 miles from target. Most
turned back but General Robert Travis, commanding the First
Division, elected to continue towards his objectives at Oschersleben.
Despite the round-trip P-51 Mustang escort, and a valiant
one-man stand against 30 enemy fighters that earned James Howard a
Medal of Honor, more than 500 German fighters tore the First
Division apart. Of 238 heavy bombers (including the leading combat
wing of the second formation) that ignored the recall and
continued to target, 60 were lost. This reflected a 25% loss rate
and Eighth Air Force
veterans of the previous year recalled the January 11 mission as the
Second Schweinfurt.
On
January 16 General Dwight Eisenhower assumed duties as Supreme
Commander of all Allied forces in Europe and set up the Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) at Bushey Park in
London. Four days later General Carl Spaatz assumed responsibility
for command of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSAFE). It
was a move designed to coordinate all Allied air craft in the
theater towards the common goal of paving the way for Operation
Overlord and then lending tactical support to insure its
success. It placed Doolittle and his Eighth Air Force under General
Spaatz, along with General Nathan Twining's Mediterranean-based 15th
Air Force. The concept was to unify command for the bombardment of
Europe, in contrast to the Luftwaffe's structure of having separate
commands for Germany and France. Under Spaatz, Doolittle's bombers
would attack from England, while 15th Air Force heavy bombers struck
from below to attack targets at the far range of the Mighty
Eighth.
On
January 24 Jimmy Doolittle dispatched the largest bomber force yet,
857 bombers, to attack transportation and industrial targets inside
Germany. Poor weather and heavy clouds and contrails over the
English Channel made it nearly impossible for the bombers to form
up, and again General Doolittle called his bombers back. It was an
inauspicious beginning for the new commander of the Mighty Eighth,
and drew a prompt rebuke from his friend and boss, General Spaatz.
On
January 29 a massive flight of 763 heavy bombers were led deep into
Germany by Pathfinders to hit the war industries at Frankfurt/Main.
Weather not only precluded visual bombing, but caused 46 bombers to
deviate from their planned bomb route to attack Ludwigshafen as a
T/O (Target of Opportunity.) Doolittle's bombers met heavy enemy
resistance but only
29 bombers were lost. That 3% casualty rate was half the
"acceptable rate of casualty" (6%) that had been the norm
in the previous months, and validated the importance of the new
long-range Mustang escorts.
On
January 30 another 701 bombers were dispatched to attack Brunswick,
suffering only 20 losses. Again however, the overcast relegated the
mission to blind-bombing and forced 51 crews to unload over T/Os
instead of their primary target. The scenario was repeated again two
days later when more than 200 of the 433 heavy bombers sent to
attack the railroad yards and industrial plants at Frankfurt/Main
unloaded on T/Os.
In
the first six weeks of the year 1944 the poor winter weather allowed
Eighth Air Force crews to fly missions on only twenty-one days. Of
those missions only six were accomplished by visual bombing, and
only two of those six were against major industrial targets inside
Germany. The situation was no better for the Fifteenth Air
Force, based in the Mediterranean and tasked with attacking German
from below. With D-Day looming and now less than three months
away, the German factories continued to operate at near capacity,
these Pointblank targets shielded by weather that precluded the kind
of missions the CBO had envisioned or, when Pathfinder missions were
flown despite the weather, hidden from accurate bombing by
consistent 10/10 cloud cover.
The
urgency of the nearly-stalemated air war was reflected in the CBO
directive issued on February 13 ordering: "The progressive
destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and
economic systems, the disruption of vital elements of lines of
communication and the material reduction of German air combat
strength, by the successful prosecution of the combined bomber
offensive from all convenient bases." That new directive
further established the priorities for targets with industries
focused on German fighter aircraft production (including
ball-bearing production) at the top of the list. It was a refinement
of the Pointblank directive that was welcomed by the American air
crews, all of whom were eager to destroy the Luftwaffe and claim
aerial superiority over Europe. It was the embodiment of a mission
code-named Argument that had been designed the previous fall,
modified repeatedly throughout the winter, and postponed again and
again because of the prohibitive weather.
With
the heavy influx of new aircraft and crews, increasing numbers of
P-51s for escort, and the misery of the cold, damp weather gnawing
at morale, the Mighty Eighth was poised for a massive strike.
Only the weather stood in the way of launching Operation Argument.
On
February 19 a pressure area began developing over the Baltic and
Allied weather forecasters, for the first time in months, saw hope
that it would move southeast to clear the skies over Europe. Operation
Argument was ordered operational, and mission directives were
sent to General Doolittle in England and General Brereton in the Mediterranean
to order a maximum effort for the following morning.